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Introduction
In December 2015, Angola reported its first locally acquired 
case of yellow fever in nearly a decade. The ensuing epidemic 
was first recognized in Luanda, then spread across Angola’s 
18 provinces, resulting in 4347 suspected or confirmed cases 
and 377 deaths.1 International travellers departing from An-
gola then imported yellow fever virus into Kenya and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo,2 where another epidemic 
ensued, causing 2987 suspected or confirmed cases and 121 
deaths.1 Furthermore, 11 foreign workers infected in Angola 
travelled to urban centres in China, the first time imported 
cases of yellow fever have been reported in Asia.3 Four cases 
were recently imported into Europe over an 8-month period 
by travellers returning from South America.4 The time period 
is in stark contrast to the 27 years during which the previous 
four cases of travel-associated yellow fever were imported into 
Europe.4 In early 2018, nine cases were exported from Brazil 
and led to three deaths.5 Increased air travel and globalization 
is making it easier for humans to transport yellow fever virus 
across international borders, potentially catalysing deadly 
urban epidemics.3
An essential tool in the fight against yellow fever is a 
live-attenuated vaccine developed in 1937.6 This vaccine is 
vital for the prevention and control of yellow fever epidem-
ics since no effective antiviral therapy exists.7 However, a 
substantial proportion of the world’s yellow fever vaccine 
stock was recently consumed in response to epidemics in 
Africa8 and Brazil.9 As a stopgap measure, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) approved fractional dosing to extend 
the vaccine supply, while recognizing that the duration of 
immunity may be compromised.10 With only four WHO-
qualified yellow fever vaccine manufacturers in the world, 
rapid replenishment of the global emergency stockpile 
stretches finite resources, potentially resulting in vaccine 
shortages for preventive campaigns.11 In late 2017, stocks of 
YF-VAX® (Sanofi Pasteur, Lyon, France) in North America 
were depleted because of manufacturing difficulties.5 Should 
another urban epidemic occur in the near future, vaccine 
demand could easily exceed the available supply.
Although many countries have vaccination policies to prevent 
international spread of the yellow fever virus, implementation is 
inconsistent.12 Most, but not all countries where yellow fever is 
endemic require arriving international travellers without medical 
contraindications to provide official documentation of vaccination 
as a prerequisite for entry. As the vaccine provides protective im-
munity to 90% and 99% of individuals 10 and 30 days after vacci-
nation, respectively,13 most travellers are protected from acquiring 
and exporting the yellow fever virus. Furthermore, some countries 
where the disease is not endemic, but where the competent mos-
quito vector Aedes aegypti is present require travellers arriving from 
a yellow fever-endemic country to provide proof of vaccination.14
The confluence of climate change,15 rapid urbanization16 
and international air travel17 are accelerating the globalization 
of mosquito-borne viruses such as dengue, chikungunya and 
Zika viruses. Here we examined the potential for the yellow 
fever virus to spread via international air travel into the world’s 
cities, in order to guide global epidemic prevention efforts.
Objective To examine the potential for international travel to spread yellow fever virus to cities around the world.
Methods We obtained data on the international flight itineraries of travellers who departed yellow fever-endemic areas of the world in 2016 
for cities either where yellow fever was endemic or which were suitable for viral transmission. Using a global ecological model of dengue 
virus transmission, we predicted the suitability of cities in non-endemic areas for yellow fever transmission. We obtained information on 
national entry requirements for yellow fever vaccination at travellers’ destination cities.
Findings In 2016, 45.2 million international air travellers departed from yellow fever-endemic areas of the world. Of 11.7 million travellers 
with destinations in 472 cities where yellow fever was not endemic but which were suitable for virus transmission, 7.7 million (65.7%) were 
not required to provide proof of vaccination upon arrival. Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Peru and the United States of America had the highest 
volumes of travellers arriving from yellow fever-endemic areas and the largest populations living in cities suitable for yellow fever transmission.
Conclusion Each year millions of travellers depart from yellow fever-endemic areas of the world for cities in non-endemic areas that appear 
suitable for viral transmission without having to provide proof of vaccination. Rapid global changes in human mobility and urbanization 
make it vital for countries to re-examine their vaccination policies and practices to prevent urban yellow fever epidemics.
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Methods
To identify gaps in yellow fever vac-
cination policies around the world, we 
assessed the potential for the interna-
tional spread of yellow fever from areas 
deemed by WHO to be at risk of trans-
mission to areas where conditions are 
known, or predicted, to be suitable for 
transmission. Our goal was to provide a 
global perspective on urban exposure to 
imported yellow fever virus, irrespective 
of past or present epidemics.
Global endemicity
We considered places where WHO rec-
ommended yellow fever vaccination in 
2016, including recently identified parts 
of Brazil, to be areas where humans were 
at risk of local infection.18–20 We refer 
to these areas as yellow fever-endemic 
areas, although we recognize that they 
may not have been experiencing yellow 
fever transmission. We excluded places 
where yellow fever vaccination was 
generally not recommended by WHO. 
For non-holoendemic countries (i.e. 
where only part of the country was at 
risk of yellow fever),20 we delineated 
subnational areas of risk using ArcGIS 
v. 10.4.1 (Esri, Redlands, United States of 
America). We then used LandScan (Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, 
USA)21 to estimate the total population 
living within the global range of the yel-
low fever virus.
International dispersion
To account for the possibility that 
individuals infected with yellow fever 
virus within an endemic area might 
travel by land to a nearby airport in a 
non-endemic area, we used ArcGIS v. 
10.4.1 to identify all commercial airports 
registered with the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA): (i) within 
200 km of any yellow fever-endemic 
area worldwide (base scenario); and 
(ii) within 200 km of any city within a 
yellow fever-endemic area (urban sce-
nario). In the base scenario, we consid-
ered travellers departing from areas of 
potential sylvatic or urban transmission 
as possible sources of exported yellow 
fever virus. In the urban scenario, we 
focused on travellers departing from 
airports within 200 km of a city (i.e. an 
urban centre with more than 300 000 
residents, as defined by the United Na-
tions’ World Urbanization Prospects)22 
located in a yellow fever-endemic area. 
We mapped the final destination air-
ports and the number of international 
travellers (determined from unique trips 
on commercial flights) departing from 
airports in each scenario by analysing 
worldwide tickets sales data from IATA 
between 1 January and 31 December 
2016.23 These data included the travel-
lers’ full itineraries: their initial airport 
of embarkation, their final destination 
airport and, where applicable, connect-
ing airports. The data did not detail 
uncompleted trips due, for example, 
to cancelled or missed flights. Overall, 
these data accounted for an estimated 
90% of all trips on commercial flights 
worldwide; the remaining 10% were 
modelled using airline market intelli-
gence.23 Such data have been used previ-
ously to anticipate the global spread of 
emerging infectious diseases.24
Potential for urban transmission
To identify cities where yellow fever was 
not endemic, but which may have been 
suitable for viral transmission, we used a 
high-resolution, global, ecological mod-
el of dengue virus transmission, which 
was developed using empirical data on 
the real-world occurrence of dengue 
fever and associated environmental 
and climatic predictors of dengue virus 
transmission.25 We assumed that cit-
ies predicted to be suitable for dengue 
virus transmission were also eco-
logically suitable for yellow fever virus 
transmission, because both viruses are 
primarily transmitted by Aedes aegypti, 
an anthropophilic mosquito highly 
adapted to urban settings.25 Adopting 
a conservative approach, we excluded 
cities where the predicted probability 
of dengue-suitability was below 50%. As 
our analysis focused on urban importa-
tion and transmission of yellow fever 
virus, we did not consider its introduc-
tion into rural, sylvatic areas or trans-
mission among non-human primates. 
We defined a yellow fever-suitable city 
as a population centre with at least 
300 000 residents in an area where the 
yellow fever virus was not endemic but 
which was predicted to be suitable for 
viral transmission. We excluded cities 
above 2300 m because environmental 
conditions at these elevations are con-
sidered unsuitable for yellow fever virus 
transmission.26
We assessed the potential for im-
portation of the yellow fever virus by 
quantifying the volume of airline pas-
sengers travelling from yellow fever-
endemic areas of the world, according 
to our base and urban scenarios, to 
yellow fever-suitable and -endemic cit-
ies. We also considered the possibility 
that individuals infected with the virus 
might arrive at an airport in a non-
endemic area and then travel by land 
to a neighbouring city within a yellow 
fever-endemic or -suitable area: in our 
analysis, we included all commercial 
airports located within 200 km of these 
mutually exclusive geographical areas. 
We then categorized traveller flows ac-
cording to the official yellow fever travel 
vaccination policy in each endemic 
and non-endemic country: (i) no proof 
of yellow fever vaccination required; 
(ii) proof of vaccination required if 
arriving from a yellow fever-endemic 
country; and (iii) proof of vaccination 
required if arriving from any country.27 
Finally, we aggregated the resident 
populations of all yellow fever-suitable 
and -endemic cities.
Results
We estimated that 923 million people 
lived in areas of the world where yellow 
fever was endemic in 2016, spanning 25 
holoendemic and 17 non-holoendemic 
countries or territories (Box 1).
In our base scenario, 45.2 million 
travellers departed from yellow fever-
endemic areas for international desti-
nations in 2016. Of these, 7.9 million 
(17.4%) had final destinations at airports 
Box 1. Countries and territories at risk of yellow fever transmission in 2016, according 
to the United States’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the World 
Health Organization1–3
Countries and territories where yellow fever was endemic (i.e. holoendemic countries)
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, French Guiana, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Suriname, Togo, Uganda
Countries where only a portion were at risk of yellow fever (i.e. non-holoendemic countries)
Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of ), Brazil, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of )
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within or adjacent to yellow fever-
endemic cities, 11.7 million (25.8%) 
had destinations at airports within or 
adjacent to yellow fever-suitable cities 
and 25.6 million (57.8%) had other 
destinations (Fig. 1). Of the 7.9 million 
travellers with international destinations 
at or near other yellow fever-endemic 
cities, 0.86 million (11.0%) landed in a 
country where proof of yellow fever vac-
cination was not required upon arrival: 
one holoendemic country (i.e. South 
Sudan) and three non-holoendemic 
countries (i.e. Argentina, Brazil and 
Peru). Of the 11.7 million travellers 
with destinations at or near yellow 
fever-suitable cities, 7.7 million (65.7%) 
landed in a country where proof of yel-
low fever vaccination was not required: 
four non-holoendemic countries (i.e. 
Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru) 
and 12 non-endemic countries (e.g. the 
United States). Conversely, 14.9 mil-
lion travellers departed non-endemic 
areas of the world for airports within or 
adjacent to yellow fever-endemic cities; 
11.4 million (76.4%) of these travellers 
landed in countries where proof of yel-
low fever vaccination was not required 
on arrival.
In our urban scenario, 32.2 mil-
lion travellers departed airports within 
or near yellow fever-endemic cities 
for international destinations in 2016. 
Of these, 6.1 million (18.9%) arrived 
at or near yellow fever-endemic cities 
(Table 1); there was one fewer destina-
tion city than in our base scenario. In 
addition, 8.4 million (26.1%) arrived 
at or near yellow fever-suitable cities; 
there were six fewer destination cities 
than in our base scenario (Table 2). 
As the urban scenario considered only 
travellers departing from airports within 
200 km of a city within a yellow fever-
endemic area, it represents the potential 
for dispersion during an urban outbreak 
rather than dispersion secondary to 
urban or sylvatic transmission, as in the 
base scenario.
Among countries with yellow fever-
endemic cities, Brazil, Colombia and Ni-
geria had the highest traveller numbers 
from other yellow fever-endemic areas 
of the world and the largest populations 
living in yellow fever-endemic cities 
(Fig. 2). Colombia and Nigeria required 
proof of yellow fever vaccination from 
travellers arriving from other yellow 
fever-endemic countries but not from 
non-endemic countries. In contrast, 
Brazil did not require proof of vac-
cination from travellers arriving from 
yellow fever-endemic countries. Among 
countries with yellow fever-suitable cit-
ies, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Peru 
and the United States had the highest 
traveller numbers arriving from yellow 
fever-endemic areas and the largest 
populations living in yellow fever-
suitable cities (Fig. 3). Of these, Brazil, 
Mexico, Peru and the United States did 
not require proof of yellow fever vac-
cination from travellers arriving from 
yellow fever-endemic areas. Fig. 4 and 
Table 3 (available at: http://www.who.
int/bulletin/volumes/96/5/17-205658) 
show the resident populations of yellow 
fever-endemic cities globally according 
to national yellow fever travel vaccina-
tion policy and Fig. 5 and Table 4 (avail-
able at: http://www.who.int/bulletin/
volumes/96/5/17-205658) show the 
corresponding populations of yellow 
fever-suitable cities.
Discussion
The 2016 yellow fever epidemic in 
Angola and the associated exportation 
of cases into urban areas of China ex-
posed shortcomings in existing yellow 
fever travel vaccination policies and 
practices. As a holoendemic country, 
Angola has a policy that requires all 
international travellers to provide proof 
of yellow fever vaccination upon arrival. 
In addition, China has the same require-
ment for travellers arriving from yellow 
fever-endemic countries. Yet both lines 
of defence failed, leading to the first 
cases of imported yellow fever in Asia. 
Recent research has confirmed the role 
played by air travel between Angola and 
China in increasing the risk of importing 
the disease.28 This event illustrates that 
urban areas that have never experienced 
yellow fever transmission, or have not 





























































Notes: A yellow fever-endemic area was a national or subnational area where the World Health Organization recommended yellow fever vaccination. A yellow 
fever-endemic city was a city located in an area where vaccination was recommended. A yellow fever-suitable city was a city that was suitable for dengue virus 
transmission (see main text for details). Other destinations were: (i) all destinations where yellow fever was not endemic and which were not suitable for yellow 
fever transmission; and (ii) areas where yellow fever was endemic or which were suitable for yellow fever transmission but did not contain a settlement with a 
population greater than 300 000.
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experienced it in modern times, are 
increasingly susceptible to epidemics. 
We elected to study the travel conduits 
that could facilitate the international 
spread of yellow fever virus into the 
world’s cities.
First, our analysis revealed that 
89% of travellers departing from yellow 
fever-endemic areas for yellow fever-
endemic cities in other countries (both 
holoendemic and non-holoendemic) 
in 2016 were required to provide proof 
of vaccination upon arrival. This high 
proportion presumably reflects coun-
tries’ desire to protect themselves against 
importation of yellow fever virus. To 
reduce the risk of importation, and of 
the consequent potential for domestic 
transmission and of possible exportation 
of yellow fever virus, these countries 
Table 1. International air travellers arriving in cities where yellow fever was endemic from other endemic areas or cities, 2016
Destination country or 
territory,a by rankb
No. travellers arriving from yellow fever-endemic 
areas
Urban population of 
destination country, 
millionsc
Proof of yellow fever vaccination 
required upon arrival
Departure airport within 
200 km of a yellow fever-
endemic area (base 
scenario)d
Departure airport within 








1. Colombia 1 373 439 776 317 16.4 Yes No
2. Panama 995 941 625 764 1.7 Yes No
3. Brazil 769 203 474 260 54.6 Nof Nof
4. Nigeria 532 602 485 319 46.8 Yes No
5. Ghana 389 242 378 893 6.1 No Yes
6. Côte d’Ivoire 360 179 347 372 6.0 No Yes
7. Kenya 357 561 291 022 5.7 Yes No
8. Senegal 322 374 295 805 3.5 Yes No
9. Cameroon 280 895 272 308 7.5 Yes No
10. Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of )
221 837 185 895 7.3 Yes No
11. Gabon 199 560 197 595 0.7 No Yes
12. Congo 195 571 178 963 2.9 No Yes
13. Benin 189 191 186 575 1.4 Yes No
14. Mali 161 064 151 877 2.5 No Yes
15. Paraguay 151 425 112 640 2.8 Yes No
16. Uganda 149 683 135 482 1.9 Yes No
17. Angola 125 518 92 021 7.2 No Yes
18. Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of )
121 798 93 353 2.1 Yes No
19. Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
118 798 80 433 20.1 No Yes
20. Burkina Faso 105 837 97 019 3.5 Yes No
21. Togo 104 851 102 487 1.0 No Yes
22. South Sudan 92 280 83 838 0.3 No No
23. Sudan 90 271 48 908 2.1 Yes No
24. Guinea 75 603 73 078 1.9 Yes No
25. Liberia 65 060 64 915 1.3 No Yes
Other countriesg 315 213 284 692 7.4 NA NA
Total 7 864 996 6 116 831 214.7 NA NA
NA: not applicable.
a  All destination countries and territories were yellow fever-endemic areas.
b  Countries and territories were ranked according to the number of travellers arriving from yellow fever-endemic areas, which was determined by examining all 
outbound international flights from airports within areas where the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended yellow fever vaccination and all airports within 
200 km of such areas.17–19
c  Nationally aggregated population living in cities.
d  The base scenario considered international travellers arriving from airports within areas where WHO recommended yellow fever vaccination and all airports within 
200 km of such areas.
e  The urban scenario considered international travellers arriving from airports within 200 km of a city (population ≥ 300 000) in an area where WHO recommended 
yellow fever vaccination.
f  We did not take into account Brazil’s temporary yellow fever vaccination requirements for incoming passengers from Angola and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo during the 2016 outbreak.
g  There were 10 other yellow fever-endemic destination countries with an airport within 200 km of a yellow fever-endemic city with a population of at least 300 000: 
Argentina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Peru and Sierra Leone. We did not show the 7 countries where there was 
no city with at least 300 000 residents located in a yellow fever-endemic area: Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, French Guiana, Guyana, Mauritania, Suriname and Trinidad 
and Tobago.
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should focus on implementing existing 
yellow fever travel vaccination policies 
effectively. However, some travellers 
may purchase counterfeit international 
vaccination certificates,29 which makes 
this line of defence potentially fallible. 
Second, we found that less than 35% 
of travellers departing yellow fever-
endemic areas for cities that appeared 
suitable for yellow fever transmission, 
were required to provide proof of vac-
cination upon arrival. Countries that 
did not require proof of yellow fever 
vaccination might have assumed that 
the historical absence of yellow fever 
was predictive of its future absence. In 
other instances, nationally implemented 
vaccination policies may be obfuscated 
Table 2. International air travellers arriving in cities suitable for yellow fever transmission from areas or cities where yellow fever was 
endemic, 2016
Destination country or 
territory,a by rankb
No. travellers arriving from yellow fever-endemic 
areas
Urban population of 
destination country, 
millionsc
Proof of yellow fever vaccination 
required upon arrival
Departure airport 
within 200 km of a 
yellow fever-endemic 
area (base scenario)d
Departure airport within 








1. United Statesf 2 762 081 1 659 163 9.6 No No
2. Mexico 1 166 021 874 820 33.5 No No
3. United Arab Emirates 890 623 717 232 0.5 No No
4. Peru 752 113 536 161 12.1 No No
5. Ecuador 595 181 405 106 3.0 No No
6. Dominican Republic 538 042 322 848 3.5 No No
7. Brazil 481 737 311 969 44.2 Nog Nog
8. Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of )
461 006 376 804 7.6 Yes No
9. China 403 683 316 588 98.7 Yes No
10. India 385 786 345 314 235.3 Yes No
11. Cuba 372 455 237 228 3.2 Yes No
12. Saudi Arabia 319 711 256 316 6.5 Yes No
13. Costa Rica 283 169 216 087 1.2 Yes No
14. United Republic of 
Tanzania
268 038 247 515 7.8 Yes No
15. Egypt 217 597 204 251 22.8 Yes No
16. Argentina 213 665 170 456 6.3 No No
17. Rwanda 170 040 162 831 1.3 Yes No
18. Guatemala 115 834 94 882 2.9 Yes No
19. El Salvador 103 943 85 577 1.1 Yes No
20. China, Hong Kong SAR 96 258 74 284 7.3 No No
21. Sudan 90 037 48 723 5.6 Yes No
22. Thailand 86 481 62 266 12.7 Yes No
23. Puerto Rico 77 282 57 657 2.8 No No
24. Jamaica 76 848 19 822 0.6 Yes No
25. Nicaragua 68 481 59 128 1.0 No No
Other countriesh 665 455 531 709 211.0 NA NA
Total 11 661 567 8 394 737 742.1 NA NA
NA: not applicable; SAR: Special Administrative Region.
a  Destination cities in these countries and territories were ecologically suitable for yellow fever virus transmission but were not in yellow fever-endemic areas.
b  Countries and territories were ranked according to the number of travellers arriving from yellow fever-endemic areas, which was determined by examining all 
outbound international flights from airports within areas where the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended yellow fever vaccination and all airports within 
200 km of such areas.17–19
c  Nationally aggregated population living in yellow fever-suitable cities. In the urban scenario, there were six fewer yellow fever-suitable destination cities than in the 
base scenario: Satna, India (population 0.31 million); Ibb, Yemen (population 0.45 million); Al Hudaydah, Yemen (population 0.57 million); Taiz, Yemen (population 
0.69 million); Aden, Yemen (population 0.88 million); and Sana’a, Yemen (population 2.7 million).
d  Our base scenario considered international travellers arriving from airports within areas where WHO recommended yellow fever vaccination and all airports within 
200 km of such areas.
e  Our urban scenario considered international travellers arriving from airports within 200 km of a city (population ≥ 300 000) in an area where WHO recommended 
yellow fever vaccination.
f  United States’ territory included all continental states and Hawaii. Puerto Rico was not included and is listed separately. Other United States territories, such as Guam, 
American Samoa and the United States Virgin Islands, do not have cities with at least 300 000 residents and are thus not included.
g  We did not take into account Brazil’s temporary yellow fever vaccination requirements for incoming passengers from Angola and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo during the 2016 outbreak.
h  There were 29 other countries or territories suitable for yellow fever transmission (details available from the corresponding author on request).
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because only a small geographical area 
within a country may be ecologically 
suitable for yellow fever transmission; 
for example, the 9.5 million United 
States’ residents who live in five urban 
areas that appear suitable for yellow fe-
ver transmission represent less than 3% 
of the country’s population. Nonethe-
less, countries should carefully consider 
whether the risk of yellow fever virus 
importation and subsequent domestic 
transmission warrants a change to exist-
ing yellow fever travel vaccination poli-
cies or practices. Of note, administering 
yellow fever vaccine at national ports of 
entry to individuals who do not hold a 
record of vaccination will increase im-
munity among susceptible travellers but 
will not prevent importation of the virus 
by travellers who are already infected. 
Third, we found that less than 25% of 
travellers who departed from areas of 
the world where yellow fever was not 
endemic for yellow fever-endemic cit-
ies were required to provide proof of 
vaccination upon arrival. This reveals 
a policy gap in protecting international 
travellers against becoming infected and 
subsequently exporting the virus. This 
low proportion may reflect the absence 
of national incentives because countries 
with entry requirements for yellow fever 
vaccination are protecting international 
travellers and the global community 
without realizing any domestic benefit.
Although broader use of yellow 
fever vaccine by international travellers 
could limit dispersion of the virus and 
reduce the risk of urban epidemics, its 
use in non-epidemic settings must be 
carefully weighed against the risk of 
vaccine-associated neurological and 
viscerotropic events. Infants younger 
than 9 months, adults aged 60 years and 
older and individuals with thymus dis-
orders and weakened immune systems 
are at an elevated risk of these potentially 
life-threatening events.30 Furthermore, 
if international changes in vaccination 
policy and practice are implemented 
and enforced, travellers could face dif-
ficulties accessing yellow fever vaccine, 
given current diminished stocks and 
constrained manufacturing capacity. 
Even though an estimated 50 million 
vaccine doses were produced in 2017,11 
a new yellow fever epidemic in a popu-
lated urban centre could readily deplete 
global emergency vaccine stockpiles.
We made several important as-
sumptions in our analysis. First, we 
assumed that the risk of yellow fever 
virus dispersion across all yellow fever-
endemic areas of the world was uniform, 
because we were not attempting to 
model the spread of the virus out of a 
particular geographical area that was 
experiencing epizootic or epidemic ac-
tivity. Rather, our goal was to describe 
global pathways via which the yellow 
fever virus could disseminate to trigger 
epidemics in the world’s cities, thereby 
identifying crucial gaps in existing yel-
low fever travel vaccination policies and 
practices. Since the potential for inter-
national dispersion of the virus out of 
rural areas presumably differs from that 
out of urban areas, our urban scenario 
focused solely on travellers departing 
airports in or immediately adjacent to 
cities in yellow fever-endemic areas. 
However, the recent case of a traveller 
who acquired a yellow fever virus infec-
tion in rural Suriname and then flew to 
Fig. 2. International air travellers arriving from yellow fever-endemic areas and aggregated population of yellow fever-endemic 
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No proof of vaccination required on arrival from any country
Proof of vaccination required on arrival from any country
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Notes: Both axes have a logarithmic scale. A yellow fever-endemic area was a national or subnational area where the World Health Organization recommended 
yellow fever vaccination. The symbols indicate the national yellow fever vaccination policy for travellers arriving in the country.
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the Netherlands indicates that there is 
still a risk of yellow fever exportation 
from rural areas.4
Our assumptions about the suit-
ability of cities for yellow fever virus 
transmission were based on a global 
ecological model of dengue virus trans-
mission. A recently published modelling 
analysis of suitability for yellow fever 
transmission globally predicted a similar 
pattern to the pattern of dengue suitabil-
ity we assumed,31 especially in urbanized 
regions, which were the primary focus 
of our study. However, we may have 
overestimated the risk of yellow fever 
transmission in areas where dengue 
is known to be active but where Ae. 
albopictus rather than Ae. aegypti is the 
dominant vector (e.g. in China, Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region). 
On the other hand, although Ae. aegypti 
is the primary vector for transmission 
of yellow fever virus, some studies have 
indicated that Ae. albopictus might also 
be a competent vector in nature.32 As our 
analysis focused on the importation of 
yellow fever virus into cities and ignored 
downstream transmission among non-
human primates in rural sylvatic cycles, 
we believe our model of urban dengue 
suitability closely approximates suitabil-
ity for yellow fever virus transmission.
Our model of dengue suitability 
represents an annualized view of po-
tential yellow fever transmission. The 
model does not account for seasonal 
variability due to changing climatic 
conditions.33 Furthermore, we did not 
take into account seasonal patterns in 
local (i.e. urban–rural) or international 
travel despite the possibility that interac-
tions between the ecological seasonality 
of yellow fever transmission and the 
seasonality of human mobility could 
influence the risk of yellow fever virus 
importation. In addition, we did not 
attempt to quantify variations in the 
intensity of transmission between tropi-
cal and subtropical climates or between 
industrialized and developing areas 
of the world. For example, because of 
differences in climate and the built en-
vironment,34 some cities in the southern 
United States have experienced sporadic 
transmission of dengue, chikungunya 
and Zika viruses, whereas cities in Latin 
America have experienced sustained 
and intense transmission of the same 
pathogens. Moreover, we did not at-
tempt to estimate how the underlying 
level of population immunity influences 
the potential for epidemics. Although we 
presumed that populations in yellow fe-
ver-suitable cities would have negligible 
immunity to the yellow fever virus, we 
made no assumptions about immunity 
in yellow fever-endemic cities, because 
high-resolution data on yellow fever 
vaccination and natural infection were 
lacking. Lastly, we did not take into ac-
count Brazil’s temporary yellow fever 
vaccination requirements for travellers 
who came from Angola and the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo during the 
2017 yellow fever outbreak and therefore 
categorized Brazil as not requiring proof 
of vaccination upon arrival from yellow 
fever-endemic countries.
With more than 3 billion domes-
tic and international passengers now 
boarding commercial flights each year, 
Fig. 3. International air travellers arriving from yellow fever-endemic areas and aggregated population of yellow fever-suitable 





































International air travellers arriving from yellow fever-endemic areas
No proof of vaccination required on arrival from any country Proof of vaccination required on arrival from yellow fever-endemic countries



















































United States of America
SAR: Special Administrative Region.
Notes: Both axes have a logarithmic scale. A yellow fever-suitable city was ecologically suitable for yellow fever virus transmission but was not located in a yellow 
fever-endemic area, which was defined as an area where the World Health Organization recommended yellow fever vaccination. The symbols indicate the national 
yellow fever vaccination policy for travellers arriving in the country.
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humans have become the primary agents 
for the global spread of mosquito-borne 
viruses such as dengue, chikungunya, 
Zika and yellow fever. Our findings on 
yellow fever virus transmission provide 
countries with insights into contem-
porary vulnerabilities to international 
spread of the virus. Our goal was to help 
countries ensure that their policies and 
interventions to prevent, or to protect 
against, the international spread of yel-
low fever virus are commensurate with 
existing risks and avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic 
and trade, as per International Health 
Regulations (2005).35 At a time when 
global yellow fever vaccine supplies are 
diminished, an epidemic in a densely 
populated city could have substantial 
health and economic consequences. 
Hence, the global community need to 
carefully re-examine existing yellow 
fever travel vaccination policies and 
practices to prevent urban epidemics. ■
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صخلم
ةيضرلحا قطانلما في ءارفصلا ىّملحا راشتناو لماعلا لوح رفسلا
 راشتنا  لىإ  لماعلا  لوح  رفسلا  يدؤي  نأ  ةيلماتحا  صحف  ضرغلا
.لماعلا ندم في ءارفصلا ىّملحا سويرف
 تلاحرلا مئاوق نأشب تانايبلا نم ةعوممج لىع انلصح دقل ةقيرطلا
 نم نياعت يتلا قطانلما نم اورداغ نيذلا نيرفاسلما مضت يتلا ةيلودلا
 تناك ندم لىإ ينهجتم ،2016 ماع في لماعلا لوح ءارفصلا ىّملحا
 راشتنلا ةيتاوم تناك يتلا  وأ ابه ءارفصلا ىّملحا راشتنا  نم نياعت
 لاقتنلا  يلماع  يئيب  جذومن  مادختسابو  .ابه  ةيسويرفلا  ىودعلا
 في  عقت  يتلا  ندلما  ةمءلام  ىدمب  ؤبنتلاب  انمق  ،كنضلا  سويرف
 انلصحو .اهيلإ ءارفصلا ىّملحا لاقتنلا ىّملحاب ةباصم يرغ قطانم
 مايف نيرفاسلما لاخدإب حماسلل ةينطولا تابلطتلما نع تامولعم لىع
.نورفاسلما اهيلإ هجتي يتلا ندلما في ءارفصلا ىّملحا ميعطتب قلعتي
 تلاحرلا  برع  رفاسم  نويلم 45.2  رداغ  ،2016  ماع  في  جئاتنلا
 .لماعلا  لوح  ءارفصلا  ىّملحا  نم  نياعت  قطانم  نم  ةيلودلا  ةيولجا
 نم  نياعت  لم  ةنيدم 472  لىإ  اوهتجا  رفاسم  نويلم 11.7  ينب  نمو
 سويرفلا  لاقتنلا  ةمئلام  تناك  اهنكل  ابه  ءارفصلا  ىّملحا  راشتنا
 ينبلاطُم  )% 65.7  ةبسنب(  نيرفاسلما  نم  نويلم 7.7  نكي  لم  ،ابه
 دقو  .لوصولا  دنع  ميعطتلا  لىع  ملهوصح  لوح  تابثإ  ميدقتب
 ةدحتلما تايلاولاو ويربو كيسكلماو دنلهاو ينصلاو ليزابرلا تقلت
 قطانم  نم  اولصو  نيذلا  نيرفاسلما  نم  بركلأا  دادعلأا  ةيكيرملأا
 يذلا بركلأا ناكسلا ةبسن نولثمي اوناكو ءارفصلا ىّملحاب ةباصم
.اهيلإ ءارفصلا ىّملحا لاقتنلا ةمئلام ندم في نوشيعي
 ةباصم قطانم نم ماع لك في نيرفاسلما نم ينيلالما رداغي جاتنتسلاا
 ةباصم  يرغ  قطانم  في  عقت  ندم  لىإ  لماعلا  لوح  ءارفصلا  ىّملحاب
 نود  اهيلإ  سويرفلا  لاقتنلا  ةمئلام  انهأ  ودبت  يتلاو  ىودعلاب
 تايريغتلا  نإ .ميعطتلا  لىع لوصلحا لىع تابثإ  ميدقت لىإ ةجالحا
 متتح ةيضرلحا تاعمتجلما نيوكتو شربلا ةكرح في ةعيسرلا ةيلماعلا
 تمايعطتلا  يرفوت  تاسراممو تاسايس في رظنلا  ةداعإ  نادلبلا  لىع












结果 2016 年，4520 万搭乘国际航班的旅客从全球
黄热病流行区出发。其中，1170 万旅客的目的地位
于 472 个非黄热病流行区的城市，但这些城市属于病
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Résumé 
Déplacements internationaux entre des centres urbains mondiaux propices à la transmission de la fièvre jaune
Objectif Évaluer la capacité des déplacements internationaux à 
propager le virus de la fièvre jaune dans des villes du monde entier.
Méthodes Nous avons recueilli des données sur les itinéraires de vols 
internationaux de voyageurs qui quittaient des zones d’endémie de la 
fièvre jaune à travers le monde en 2016 pour se rendre dans des villes où 
la fièvre jaune était endémique ou qui étaient propices à la transmission 
virale. À l’aide d’un modèle écologique mondial de transmission du 
virus de la dengue, nous avons prédit le caractère approprié de villes 
situées dans des zones non endémiques pour la transmission de la 
fièvre jaune. Nous avons obtenu des informations sur les conditions 
nationales d’entrée relatives à la vaccination contre la fièvre jaune dans 
les villes d’arrivée des voyageurs.
Résultats En 2016, 45,2 millions de passagers de vols internationaux 
ont quitté des zones d’endémie de la fièvre jaune situées dans le monde 
entier. Sur 11,7 millions de voyageurs à destination de 472 villes où 
la fièvre jaune n’était pas endémique, mais qui étaient propices à la 
transmission du virus, 7,7 millions (65,7%) n’ont pas eu à fournir de 
preuve de vaccination à leur arrivée. C’est au Brésil, en Chine, aux États-
Unis d’Amérique, en Inde, au Mexique et au Pérou que les volumes de 
voyageurs arrivant de zones d’endémie de la fièvre jaune étaient les plus 
élevés et que le nombre de personnes vivant dans des villes propices à 
la transmission de la fièvre jaune était le plus important.
Conclusion Chaque année, des millions de voyageurs quittent, sans 
avoir à fournir de preuve de vaccination, des zones d’endémie de la 
fièvre jaune à travers le monde pour se rendre dans des villes situées 
dans des zones non endémiques qui s’avèrent propices à la transmission 
virale. Compte tenu de l’évolution rapide de la mobilité humaine et de 
l’urbanisation dans le monde entier, il est indispensable que les pays 
réexaminent leurs politiques et pratiques de vaccination pour prévenir 
les épidémies de fièvre jaune en milieu urbain. 
Резюме
Международные поездки между мировыми городскими центрами, подверженными распространению 
желтой лихорадки 
Цель Изучить потенциальное влияние международных поездок 
на распространение вируса желтой лихорадки в городах по 
всему миру.
Методы Авторы получили данные о маршрутах международных 
перелетов путешественников, которые в 2016 году отправлялись 
из районов мира, эндемичных по желтой лихорадке, для тех 
городов, где желтая лихорадка не была эндемичной или в 
которых были благоприятные условия для передачи вируса. 
Используя глобальную экологическую модель передачи вируса 
денге, авторы предсказали наличие благоприятных условий для 
передачи желтой лихорадки в городах в неэндемичных районах. 
Авторы получили информацию о национальных требованиях 
на въезд для вакцинации против желтой лихорадки в городах 
назначения путешественников.
Результаты В 2016 году 45,2 миллиона пассажиров международных 
авиарейсов совершили вылеты из районов мира, эндемичных 
по желтой лихорадке. Из 11,7 миллиона путешественников с 
пунктами назначения в 472 городах, где желтая лихорадка не 
была эндемичной, но в которых имелись благоприятные условия 
для передачи вируса, 7,7 миллиона (65,7%) не были обязаны 
по прибытии предоставлять подтверждающие документы 
о вакцинации. В Бразилии, Индии, Китае, Мексике, Перу и 
Соединенных Штатах Америки было наибольшее число 
путешественников, прибывающих из районов, эндемичных по 
желтой лихорадке. А также в этих странах наибольшее число 
людей проживает в городах с благоприятными условиями для 
передачи вируса желтой лихорадки.
Вывод Каждый год миллионы путешественников отправляются 
из районов мира, эндемичных по желтой лихорадке, в города 
в неэндемичных районах, которые, по-видимому, пригодны 
для передачи вируса, без необходимости предоставления 
подтверждающих документов о вакцинации. Стремительные 
глобальные изменения в мобильности людей и урбанизации 
делают для стран жизненно важным вопрос пересмотра своей 
политики и практики вакцинации для предотвращения эпидемий 
желтой лихорадки в городах.
Resumen
Viaje internacional por los centros urbanos del mundo vulnerables a la transmisión de la fiebre amarilla
Objetivo Examinar el potencial de los viajes internacionales de propagar 
el virus de la fiebre amarilla en ciudades de todo el mundo.
Métodos Se obtuvieron datos de los itinerarios de vuelo internacionales 
de viajeros que partieron de áreas endémicas de la fiebre amarilla en el 
mundo en 2016 hacia ciudades donde la fiebre amarilla era endémica 
o que eran adecuadas para la transmisión viral. Mediante el uso de 
un modelo ecológico global de la transmisión del virus del dengue, 
se predijo la idoneidad de las ciudades en áreas no endémicas para 
la transmisión de la fiebre amarilla. Se obtuvo información sobre los 
requisitos nacionales de entrada sobre la vacunación contra la fiebre 
amarilla en las ciudades de destino de los viajeros.
Resultados En 2016, 45,2 millones de viajeros de vuelos internacionales 
salieron de áreas endémicas de fiebre amarilla en el mundo. De los 
11,7 millones de viajeros con destinos en 472 ciudades donde la fiebre 
amarilla no era endémica, pero eran aptas para la transmisión viral, 7,7 
millones (65,7%) no estaban obligados a proporcionar una prueba de 
vacunación al llegar. Brasil, China, la India, México, Perú y los Estados 
Unidos tenían los mayores volúmenes de viajeros que provenían de áreas 
endémicas de fiebre amarilla y las mayores poblaciones en ciudades 
adecuadas para la transmisión de la fiebre amarilla.
Conclusión Cada año, millones de viajeros abandonan las áreas 
endémicas de la fiebre amarilla del mundo hacia ciudades de áreas no 
endémicas que parecen adecuadas para la transmisión viral sin tener 
que presentar una prueba de vacunación. Los rápidos cambios globales 
en la movilidad humana y la urbanización hacen que sea vital que los 
países reexaminen sus políticas y prácticas de vacunación para prevenir 
las epidemias urbanas de fiebre amarilla.
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Table 3. Top 50 yellow fever - endemic destination cities of air travellers from areas or cities where yellow fever was endemic, by city 
population, 2016
Destination city, country or territory,a by rankb Populationc
Proof of yellow fever vaccination required upon arrivald
From yellow fever-endemic countries only From any country
1. Lagos, Nigeria 13 122 829 Yes No
2., Rio de Janeiro Brazil 12 902 306 No No
3. Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo 11 586 914 No Yes
4. Belo Horizonte, Brazil 5 716 422 No No
5. Luanda, Angola 5 506 000 No Yes
6. Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire 4 859 798 No Yes
7. Brasília, Brazil 4 155 476 No No
8. Nairobi, Kenya 3 914 791 Yes No
9. Medellín, Colombia 3 910 989 Yes No
10. Porto Alegre, Brazil 3 602 526 No No
11. Kano, Nigeria 3 587 049 Yes No
12. Salvador, Brazil 3 582 967 No No
13. Dakar, Senegal 3 520 215 Yes No
14. Ibadan, Nigeria 3 160 190 Yes No
15. Yaoundé, Cameroon 3 065 692 Yes No
16. Campinas, Brazil 3 047 102 No No
17. Douala, Cameroon 2 943 318 Yes No
18. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso 2 741 128 Yes No
19. Cali, Colombia 2 645 941 Yes No
20. Kumasi, Ghana 2 598 789 No Yes
21. Bamako, Mali 2 515 000 No Yes
22. Abuja, Nigeria 2 440 242 Yes No
23. Asunción, Paraguay 2 356 174 Yes No
24. Port Harcourt, Nigeria 2 343 309 Yes No
25. Goiânia, Brazil 2 284 828 No No
26. Accra, Ghana 2 277 298 No Yes
27. Maracaibo, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of ) 2 196 435 Yes No
28. Belém, Brazil 2 181 607 No No
29. Santa Cruz, Bolivia (Plurinational State of ) 2 106 682 Yes No
30. Manaus, Brazil 2 025 379 No No
31. Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of the Congo 2 015 091 No Yes
32. Mbuji-Mayi, Democratic Republic of the Congo 2 006 641 No Yes
33. Barranquilla, Colombia 1 991 158 Yes No
34. Conakry, Guinea 1 936 045 Yes No
35. Kampala, Uganda 1 935 654 Yes No
36. Brazzaville, Congo 1 887 625 No Yes
37. Ciudad de Panama, Panama 1 672 810 Yes No
38. Grande Vitória, Brazil 1 636 141 No No
39. Benin City, Nigeria 1 495 763 Yes No
40. Grande São Luis, Brazil 1 436 781 No No
41. Huambo, Angola 1 269 211 No Yes
42. Monrovia, Liberia 1 263 800 No Yes
43. N’Djaména, Chad 1 260 146 Yes No
44. Bucaramanga, Colombia 1 215 066 Yes No
45 Kananga, Democratic Republic of the Congo 1 168 687 No Yes
46. Onitsha, Nigeria 1 109 287 Yes No
47. Mombasa, Kenya 1 103 703 Yes No
48. Cartagena, Colombia 1 092 336 Yes No
49. Niamey, Niger 1 089 589 No Yes
50. Kaduna, Nigeria 1 047 815 Yes No
a  All destination countries and territories were yellow fever-endemic areas.
b  Cities were ranked according to urban population size.
c  We obtained population data from United Nations’ World Urbanization Prospects.22
d- We did not take into account Brazil’s temporary yellow fever vaccination requirements for incoming passengers from Angola and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo during the 2016 outbreak.
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Table 4. Top 50 yellow fever suitable destinations, by population, of international air travellers from areas or cities where yellow fever 
was endemic, by city population, 2016
Destination city, country or territory,a by rankb Populationc
Proof of yellow fever vaccina-







1. New Delhi; India 25 703 168 Yes No No
2. São Paulo, Brazil 21 066 245 No No Yes
3. Mumbai, India 21 042 538 Yes No No
4. Cairo, Egypt 18 771 769 Yes No No
5. Dhaka, Bangladesh 17 598 228 Yes No No
6. Karachi, Pakistan 16 617 644 Yes No No
7. Kolkata, India 14 864 919 Yes No No
8. Manila, Philippines 12 946 263 Yes No No
9. Guangzhou, China 12 458 130 Yes No No
10. Shenzhen, China 10 749 473 Yes No No
11. Jakarta, Indonesia 10 323 142 Yes No No
12. Bangalore, India 10 087 132 Yes No No
13. Lima, Peru 9 897 033 No No Yes
14. Chennai, India 9 890 427 Yes No No
15. Bangkok, Thailand 9 269 823 Yes No No
16. Hyderabad, India 8 943 523 Yes No No
17. Lahore, Pakistan 8 741 365 Yes No No
18. Dongguan, China 7 434 935 Yes No No
19. Ahmadabad, India 7 342 850 Yes No No
20. Hong Kong SAR, China 7 313 557 No No No
21. Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam 7 297 780 Yes No No
22. Foshan, China 7 035 945 Yes No No
23. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 6 836 911 Yes No No
24. Miami, United States 5 817 221 No No No
25. Pune, India 5 727 530 Yes No No
26. Surat, India 5 650 011 Yes No No
27. Singapore, Singapore 5 618 866 Yes No No
28. Khartoum, Sudan 5 129 358 Yes No Yes
29. Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania 5 115 670 Yes No No
30. Guadalajara, Mexico 4 843 241 No No No
31. Yangon, Myanmar 4 801 930 Yes No No
32. Chittagong, Bangladesh 4 539 393 Yes No No
33. Monterrey, Mexico 4 512 572 No No No
34. Xiamen, China 4 430 081 Yes No No
35. Jiddah, Saudi Arabia 4 075 803 Yes No No
36. Shantou, China 3 948 813 Yes No No
37. Fortaleza, Brazil 3 880 202 No No Yes
38. Recife, Brazil 3 738 526 No No Yes
39. Zhongshan, China 3 691 360 Yes No No
40. Hà Noi, Viet Nam 3 629 493 Yes No No
41. Faisalabad, Pakistan 3 566 952 Yes No No
42. Curitiba, Brazil 3 473 681 No No Yes
43. Jaipur, India 3 460 701 Yes No No
44. Fuzhou, China 3 282 932 Yes No No
45. Nanning, China 3 234 379 Yes No No
46. Lucknow, India 3 221 817 Yes No No
47. Wenzhou, China 3 207 846 Yes No No
48. Kanpur, India 3 020 795 Yes No No
49. Sana’a’, Yemen 2 961 934 No No No
50. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic 2 945 353 No No No
SAR: Special Administrative Region.
a  Destination cities in these countries and territories were ecologically suitable for yellow fever virus transmission but were not in yellow fever-endemic areas.
b  Cities were ranked according to urban population size. 
c  We obtained population data from United Nations’ World Urbanization Prospects.22
d- We did not take into account Brazil’s temporary yellow fever vaccination requirements for incoming passengers from Angola and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo during the 2016 outbreak.
e  Non-holoendemic countries have subnational areas that are at risk of yellow fever transmission as defined by the WHO and CDC Yellow Book. Cities listed in this 
table are not located within the YF extent of non-holoendemic countries.
